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Infant feeding decisions are decisions about how and what a baby 
is fed. Such decisions are highly emotionally charged. As Thomson 
et al summarise, “In the wider literature, guilt and blame is frequently 
cited in association with women's experiences of formula feeding, 
with discomfort, humiliation and fear appearing as descriptors of 
experiences of public breastfeeding”.1 I argue elsewhere that many 
problems surrounding infant feeding decisions result from a mor-
alised context created by mistakes in our assumptions about mater-
nal duties including the mistaken assumption that mothers have a 
defeasible moral duty to breastfeed.2 I argue that mothers have a 
reason, but not a moral duty to breastfeed. Even those who are con-
vinced by my argument in the case of full-term babies might find it 
harder to accept in the case of premature babies. It might seem that 
mothers do have a defeasible moral duty to breastfeed or, as is more 
likely to be appropriate in such cases, to express breastmilk. Here, I 
explain why preterm neonates present a tricky case for the right not 
to breastfeed. I show why, nonetheless, moral pressure for moth-
ers to express breastmilk in the neonatal unit is neither permissible 
nor pragmatically advisable. I argue that instead we should address 
structural barriers to providing breastmilk and support donor milk 
initiatives.
1  | NO GENER AL DUT Y TO BRE A STFEED
As I have argued elsewhere,2 much of the discourse surrounding 
infant feeding decisions assumes that if breastfeeding has health 
benefits for the baby, then mothers have a defeasible moral duty 
to breastfeed. To say someone has a moral duty to do something 
is to say that they are morally required to do that thing, and appro-
priately subject to moral censure (blame, guilt) if they do not do it. 
Defeasible moral duties are duties that are not absolute, but can be 
outweighed, undermined or cancelled by sufficiently strong coun-
tervailing considerations. For example, as a lecturer, I have a defea-
sible moral duty to turn up to teach my lectures. However, this duty 
can be outweighed. If I break my foot on the way to the classroom, I 
am permitted to go to hospital to be treated rather than struggling in 
to teach through the pain.
Defeasible moral duties have other features. Most importantly, 
if I have a defeasible moral duty to do something and I do not do it, 
then other people (with sufficient standing) can ask me to justify this 
failure. So, if I do not turn up to the lecture, I can expect emails from 
my students asking me why. If I do not have a good enough reason, 
they are entitled to blame me and I should feel guilty. On my view, 
defeasible moral duties have these features because they allow de-
feasible duties to play an important role in our moral practice, that of 
holding ourselves and others to account.
The assumption of a general defeasible duty to breastfeed is a 
mistake. First, it depends on a general assumption that any potential 
benefit to the child generates a defeasible duty for the mother. This 
assumed maximal maternal duty to benefit has unacceptable duties 
for the mother's self-ownership and well-being. So this reasoning is 
part of a worrying general trend of over-inflating maternal duties. In 
addition, we need to be particularly careful about duties to breast-
feed because breastfeeding is an ongoing, intimate relationship in-
volving the use of deeply personal areas of a woman's body.
This is not to say that children have no moral rights related to 
breastfeeding. However, the right to breastfeed should be seen as a 
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right held by the mother and child jointly against interference or lack 
of support from others. The recognition of the joint right is import-
ant because both mother and baby's rights are violated if third par-
ties interfere with breastfeeding. The baby's rights are not violated 
by the mother if she decides not to breastfeed.
2  | TRICK Y C A SES FOR THE RIGHT NOT 
TO BRE A STFEED
Cases involving preterm infants present a tricky case for my defence 
of the right not to breastfeed. This is partly because the difference 
that maternal breastmilk may make to health is much more signifi-
cant in these cases. As Bertino et al3 summarise, “Feeding preterm 
infants HM decreases the rates of infection, necrotizing enterocolitis 
(NEC), and mortality, while improving neurocognitive and cardiovas-
cular outcomes at the long-term”. 
There are other factors that speak in favour of a moral duty to 
provide breastmilk to a preterm baby. The demand to provide some 
breastmilk over a set period of time (eg expressing milk for the first 
weeks after birth in an extremely preterm infant) is very different 
from a general demand to breastfeed. It does not commit the mother 
to a long-term breastfeeding relationship. Moreover, moral duties to 
use one's body for others in extreme situations are less of a threat 
to self-ownership than moral duties to use one's body in the normal 
course of events. Many people would find it plausible that parents 
have a moral duty to donate a kidney if their child needs it. Because 
this duty only applies in an extreme situation, it does not undermine 
parental self-ownership.
However, there are factors that count against a defea-
sible moral duty to provide breastmilk even in such cases. 
Breastfeeding or pumping involves the use of deeply personal 
areas of a woman's body. Breasts have emotional and social mean-
ings that other parts—even internal organs like kidneys—do not. 
A key part of bodily autonomy is a general presumption against 
defeasible duties to engage in intimate activity. In addition, the 
parents of preterm infants are already facing exceptionally diffi-
cult circumstances.4
3  | MOR AL PRESSURE TO PROVIDE 
BRE A STMILK
I have acknowledged that it is difficult to judge whether there is a 
defeasible moral duty for mothers to provide breastmilk for prema-
ture infants. Nonetheless, I think we can say that healthcare profes-
sionals should not apply moral pressure to mothers to convince them 
to provide breastmilk. First, even if there is such a defeasible moral 
duty (and I am not convinced of this), health professionals are not 
able to have sufficient evidence to judge that a given mother is over-
all morally required to provide breastmilk. Second, moral pressure 
to breastfeed is likely to be counterproductive. So moral pressure to 
produce breastmilk in the neonatal unit is neither ethically permis-
sible nor strategically advisable.
Health professional are not in a position to judge that a given 
mother is overall morally required to provide breastmilk. This is be-
cause health professionals are not entitled to know everything they 
would need to know in order to judge whether her defeasible duty 
to breastfeed has been outweighed. They are not entitled to know 
the mother's personal history. She may have undisclosed history of 
sexual abuse or other trauma which means that she feel unable to 
provide breastmilk.
Being required to provide testimony of sexual abuse and other 
trauma to defend oneself against moral pressure to provide breast-
milk is degrading. Indeed, for a health professional to demand that 
mothers disclose intimate personal history to justify a “failure” to pro-
vide breastmilk runs contrary to the relationship of mutual trust that 
we would hope for between parents and health professionals. This 
may well be counterproductive even in terms of increasing breastmilk 
provision and have further ramifications for the infant's well-being. 
Lee and Furedi report that pressure to breastfeed can lead women 
to “come to distrust professionals, and become sceptical about the 
value of professional knowledge and advice”.5 Moreover, while feed-
ing their babies with their own expressed milk can be potentially em-
powering for mothers, moral pressure can make even mothers who 
are expressing feel like “failures” for not producing enough milk.4
4  | ALTERNATIVES TO MOR AL PRESSURE
Instead of applying moral pressure for mothers to provide breast-
milk, health professionals should provide non-judgemental infor-
mation and support to all parents. Structural barriers to providing 
breastmilk should also be identified and minimised. For example, 
producing breastmilk with a baby in hospital involves logistical chal-
lenges of trying to spend time with the baby, care for other chil-
dren, sterilise pumping equipment and make sure you are eating and 
drinking properly to sustain lactation. Policies of providing pumping 
mothers with hospital food and help with sterilising can solve some 
of these logistical challenges, making it easier for mothers to provide 
breastmilk.
Increasing access to donor milk banks is another alternative to 
putting moral pressure on mothers to provide breastmilk. This not 
only allows access to human milk to infants whose mothers cannot 
or do not want to provide maternal milk, but has been linked to in-
creased rates of breastfeeding on discharge.6
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